UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-1-2010

State v. Beavers Respondent's Brief 1 Dckt. 36183

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Beavers Respondent's Brief 1 Dckt. 36183" (2010). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2634.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2634

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE:OF IDt
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Plaintiff/Respondent/CrossAppellant,

v.
MARK D. BEAVERS,

)
)
)
)
)
)

0

COPY

NO. 36183 & 36191

)

Defendant/Appellant/CrossRespondent.

)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

HONORABLE CHARLES HOSACK
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Deputy Attorney General
Chi&f, Criminal Law Division
ELIZABETH A. KOECKERITZ
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Bois&, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334.4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

-FILED
FEB -

:··copv--1
f

I

2010

App,.,,

Sujl!llllle Coort -Court ot
tlil<!red on ATS by:-----,

-

I

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT ·APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..........................................................................1
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings .................................... 1
ISSUES ON DIRECT APPEAL ........................................................................9
ISSUE ON CROSS APPEAL ...........................................................................9
ARGUMENT ON DIRECT APPEAL ............................................................... 1O

I.

Beavers Has Failed To Show That The District
Court Erred In Refusing His Jury Instruction ............................ 1O

A.

Introduction .................................................................... 1O

B.

Standard of Review ....................................................... 1O

C.

"Necessity" Can Not Be A Viable Justification
For The Crimes Of Trafficking Or Possession
With Intent To Deliver .................................................... 11

D.

The Legislature Has Determined That
Marijuana Has No Medically Accepted Use
And, Therefore, Th.e District Court Did Not
Err In Refusing To Give Beavers' Proffered
Necessity Defense Jury Instruction ................................ 13

E.

Beavers' Failed To Present Credible Evidence
Supporting Two Elements Of The Necessity Defense ... 16
1.

Beavers Failed To Present Credible
Evidence Showing A Specific Threat
Of An Immediate Harm - The First
Element Of The Necessity Defense .................... 16

2.

F.

II.

Ill.

Beavers Has Failed To Present Evidence
Showing That The Same Objective Could
Not Have Been Accomplished By A Less
Offensive Alternative - The Third Element
Of The Necessity Defense .................................. 18

Beavers Presented Failed To Present A
Causal Relationship Between His Use Of
Marijuana And His Allegedly Improved Health
Conditions ......................................................................22

Beavers Has Failed To Show That The District
Court Erred In His Second Case By Refusing To
Let Him Present Evidence In Support Of His Proffered
Necessity Defense And Refusing To Instruct The Jury
On That Defense ....................................................................24

A.

Introduction ....................................................................24

B.

Standard of Review ....................................................... 24

C.

The District Court Correctly Refused To
Permit Beavers To Present Evidence In
Support Of His Proffered Necessity Defense
And Correctly Refused To Instruct The Jury
On That Defense ...........................................................24
1.

Beavers Failed To Present Evidence In
His Offer Of Proof Of A Specific Threat
Of Immediate Harm .............................................25

2.

Beavers Failed To Present Evidence In
His Offer Of Proof That The Same Objective
Could Have Been Accomplished By A Less
Offensive Alternative ........................................... 26

The District Court Correctly Enhanced Beavers'
Sentences In The Second Case ............................................... 29
A.

Introduction ....................................................................29

B.

Standard of Review .......................................................30

C.

The District Court Correctly Enhanced Beavers'
Second Trafficking Conviction .......................................30

ii

ARGUMENT ON CROSS APPEAL ................... ,........................................... 37
The District Court Erred When, After Withdrawing Beavers'
Admission, It Failed To Reinstate The Parties To The Status
Quo Prior To The Admission Having Been Made ................................ 37
A.

lntroduction ............................................................................... 37

B.

Standard of Review ..................................................................38

C.

The District Court Erred When, After Withdrawing
Beavers' Admission, It Failed To Reinstate The
Parties To The Status Quo Prior To The Admission
Having Been Made ...................................................................38

D.

The District Court Erred When It Decided That
Sentencing Goals Had Been Met And So It Would
Not Apply The Enhancement.. ................................................. .41

E.

The District Court Erred When It Determined That
Even If It Applied The Enhancement, It Would Not
Run Consecutively To Beavers' Other Sentences ................... .43

CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................45
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .........................................................................45

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE

CASES

Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 16 P.3d 937 (Ct. App. 2000) .............................. 10
People v. Kelly, 77 Cal. RpTr. 3d 390 (Cal. App. 2 Dist., 2008) ......................... 21
People v. Phomphakdy, 81 Cal. RpTr. 3d 443 (Cal. App. 3 Dist., 2008) ............ 21
State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 22 P .3d 116 (Ct. App. 2001) ............................. 33
State v. Bilbao, 130 Idaho 500, 943 P.2d 926 (1997) ......................................... 38
State v. Brandt, 11 O Idaho 341, 715 P.2d 1011 (Ct. App. 1986) ........................ 34
State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 8 P.3d 657 (Ct. App. 2000) ............................... 16
State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386,924 P.2d 1230 (Ct. App. 1996) ....................... 16
State v. Chisholm, 126 Idaho 319, 883 P.2d 974 (Ct. App. 1994) ...................... 24
State v. Clark, 132 Idaho 337, 971 P.2d 1161 (Ct. App. 1999} .............. 30, 34, 35
State v. Craig, 117 Idaho 983, 793 P.2d 215 (1990} .......................................... 32
Statev. Eastman, 122 Idaho 87,831 P.2d 555 (1992)................................. 12, 18
State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 844 P.2d 691 (1992) ....................................... 10
State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 69 P.3d 1052 (2003) ...................................... 41
Statev. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563,990 P.2d 144 (Ct. App.1999) .............. 39, 40
State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854,801 P.2d 563 (1990) ......................... 12, 16, 23
Statev. Johns, 112 Idaho 873,736 P.2d 1327 (1987) ....................................... 11
State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008) ..................................... 10
State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 913 P .2d 578 (1996) ....................................... 42
State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 988 P.2d 685 (1999) ........................................ 42

iv

State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303,955 P.2d 1082 (1998) ......................................... 11
State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 79 P.3d 719 (2003) ...................................... 42
State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413, 34 P .3d 1096 (Ct. App. 2001) .................. 12, 13
State v. Way, 117 Idaho 594, 790 P .2d 375 (Ct. App. 1990) .............................. 44
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980) ............................................... 24, 25
th

United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427 (9 Cir., 1985) ........................................ 22
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative,
532 U.S. 483 (2001) ................................................................................ 14
United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193 (9 th Cir., 1991) ...................................... 22
United States v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403,179 P.3d 1059 (2008) .................... 31, 32

STATUTES
21 U.S.C. § 829 .................................................................................................. 15
I.C. § 18-8005 .................................................................................................... 32
I. C. § 19-2132 .................................................................................................... 12
I.C. § 19-2514 .................................................................................................... 33
I.C. § 32-2706 .................................................................................................... 14
1.C. §§ 37-2704-2714 ....................................................................................... 15
I.C. § 37-2704 .................................................................................................... 14
I.C. § 37-2705 .................................................................................................... 14
I.C. § 37-2714 .................................................................................................... 15
I.C. § 37-2732 ............................................................................................. passim
I.C. § 37-2739 ............................................................................................. passim
I.C. § 37-3702 .................................................................................................... 14
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362. 77 ............................................................... 21
V

Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.320 ..................................................................................... 21
Wash. Rev. Code§ 69-51A.080 ......................................................................... 20

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Idaho Const. art. V, § 1 3 .................................................................................... 41

RULES
I.C.R. 48 ............................................................................................................. 39

vi

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mark Beavers appeals from his convictions and sentences in two separate
cases, which have been combined for appeal. In the first case, he appeals his
conviction and sentences for trafficking in marijuana and possession of marijuana
with intent to deliver.

In the second case, he appeals his conviction and

sentences for trafficking in marijuana, delivery of marijuana, and possession of
marijuana with intent to deliver.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Coeur d'Alene Police Department was contacted by the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency concerning a possible marijuana grow operation in
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho.

(R., vol. 1, p. 28.)

DEA agent Sam Keiser informed

Detective Eric Paull that he had researched the residence and discovered that
the owner and occupant of the residence was Mark Beavers. (Id.) The agent
had also gone to the residence and recognized the odor of marijuana. (Id.) In
addition, the agent informed Detective Paull that Beavers had not reported any
income tax in Idaho for the last 5 years. (Id.)
With this information, Detective Paull initiated an investigation into
Beavers for the manufacture of marijuana. (Id.) He obtained photographs of
Beavers' back yard that showed a greenhouse, a Quonset hut, and a garden
area. Because he did not know the age of the photographs, he also flew over the
residence and viewed the greenhouse, the garden area, and a water tank. (Id.)
Detective Paull contacted one of Beavers' neighbors who told the detective that
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there was a rumor that Beavers was a marijuana dealer and that his neighbors
had smelled marijuana in the air. (R., vol. I, p. 29.) The neighbor also said that
Beavers kept very strange hours and was extremely private about what he did in
his backyard. (Id.)
Another neighbor reported

a "skunky"

smell coming from Beavers'

property. (R., vol. I, p. 26.) Upon investigation, Detective Paull recognized the
odor of growing marijuana coming from the area of Beavers' backyard/house.
(Id.) With this information, Detective Paull obtained a search warrant for the
property. (R. vol. I., p. 32.)
On August 13, 2006, Detective Paull executed the search warrant. (Tr.,
vol. I, p. 463, Ls. 9-18. 1) He discovered and seized 44 marijuana plants that
were growing both in the house and in two greenhouses on the property. (Tr.,
vol. I, p. 491, L. 23 - p. 492, L. 1.) He also seized 25.5 pounds of marijuana from
the residence (Tr., vol. I, p. 668, Ls. 5-14) that was located in various quantities
and in different rooms throughout the residence.

(See generally, Tr., vol. I, p.

464, L. 16 - p. 565, L. 7). The detective also seized baggies and numerous
canning jars, some of which contained marijuana and labels that read: "Brought
to you by the bud shop, where quality is No. 1." (Tr., vol. I, p. 467, L. 2 - p. 468,
L. 23.)

In addition, he seized two digital scales (Tr., vol. I, p. 468, L. 24 - p.

1

There are a number of transcripts contained in the Record on Appeal. The
longest one, which includes the June 16-19, 2008 trial in the First Case and the
January 30, 2009 joint sentencing hearing, will be referred to as "Tr., vol. I;" the
transcript of the proceedings of the first day of the second trial and the
proceedings on October 28, 2008, will be referred to as "Tr., vol. II;" and the
transcript of the second and third days of the trial in the Second Case, will be
referred to as "Tr., vol. Ill."
2

469, L. 12) and grow ballasts (Tr., vol. I, p. 479, L. 23 - p. 480, L. 3). Detective

Paull also seized hash located in a cooler (Tr., vol. I, p. 475, Ls. 1-4).

He

discovered numerous magazines and books about growing and selling marijuana
(Tr., vol. I, p. 519, Ls. 7-18; R., vol. I, p. 30), and records showing detailed
recipes for hash and information on different varieties of marijuana, including
harvesting and tasting information (Tr., vol. I, p. 545, L. 7 - p. 549, L. 22; p. 554,
L. 21 - p. 556, L. 8).

Beavers was arrested and was charged with trafficking in marijuana for
possessing 25 pounds or more of marijuana, trafficking in marijuana for
possessing 25 or more marijuana plants, and possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver (hereinafter, the "First Case"). (R., vol. I, pp. 6667.) On October 19, 2006, Beavers pied not guilty to the charges (R., vol. I, p.
77-80), and was released from jail while his case was pending (R., vol. I, p. 79).

After extensive pre-trial proceedings, his case finally proceeded to trial on June
16, 2008. At trial and over the state's objection, Beavers presented and argued

his marijuana necessity defense. (See generally, Tr., vol. I, p. 779, L. 15 - p.
787, L. 10; p. 789, L. 10- p. 860, L. 17.) However, despite permitting Beavers to

argue his defense to the jury, the district court refused Beavers' proffered jury
instruction and held that Beavers had failed to present reasonable evidence on
one of the elements of the necessity defense. (Tr., vol. I, p. 893, L. 11 - p. 895,
L. 9.)

The jury acquitted Beavers of trafficking in marijuana, more than 25

pounds, but convicted him of trafficking in marijuana, more than 5 but less than
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25 pounds, and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. (R., vol. 111, pp.
562-64.)
Meanwhile, while Beavers' First Case was pending, Beavers was charged
with delivery of marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, and
trafficking in marijuana (hereinafter, the "Second Case").

(R., vol. 11, pp. 327-

330.) These new charges stemmed from a confidential informant's purchase of
marijuana from Beavers on November 21, 2007. The confidential informant had
previously met Beavers at a medical marijuana clinic in Washington and had
seen him occasionally outside of the clinic. (Tr., vol. 111, p. 10, L. 2 - p. 11, L. 9.)
Beavers told the confidential informant that he could supply marijuana and
marijuana plant starts to medical marijuana patients. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 12, L. 3 - p.

13, L. 2.)
Eventually, the confidential informant contacted the Coeur d'Alene police
department and the police department set up a controlled buy from Beavers with
the confidential informant's help. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 16, L. 13 - p. 19, L. 19.) The
confidential informant called Beavers and told him that she had a friend who was
interested in purchasing marijuana from Beavers. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 17, Ls. 10-19.)
The confidential informant, her friend (an undercover police officer) and Beavers
met at a Starbucks coffee shop. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 17, Ls. 23-25.) After talking for
approximately 20 minutes, Beavers went out to his vehicle, opened the trunk,
and sold the undercover officer an ounce of marijuana. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 18, L. 12 p. 19, L. 19; p. 44, L. 18 - p. 45, L. 12.) When the undercover officer purchased
the marijuana, she noticed multiple baggies of marijuana in Beavers' suitcase in
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his trunk. (Tr., vol. 111, p. 52, L. 24 - p. 53, L. 12.) After selling the marijuana to
the undercover police officer, Beavers was.arrested. (Tr., vol. 11, p. 134, L. 10 -

p. 135, L. 3.)
After Beavers was arrested, Detective Paull obtained a search warrant for
Beavers' residence. (Tr., vol. 11, p. 138, L. 16- p. 139, L. 5.) Upon executing the
search warrant, Detective Paull discovered 30 marijuana plants in Beavers'
greenhouses, and related growing paraphernalia, including lights, climate control
heaters, fans and electric timers. (Tr., vol. II, p. 141, L. 7 - p. 142, L. 7.) In
addition, the detective discovered 49 marijuana plant starts in the residence.
(Tr., vol. II, p. 143, Ls. 1-5.) He also seized numerous baggies, a digital scale,
and literature in the residence. (Tr., vol. II, p. 160, L. 8- p. 162, L. 2.)
Beavers was charged with delivery of marijuana, possession of marijuana
with intent to deliver and trafficking in marijuana.

(R., vol. II, pp. 327-30.)

In

addition, in Parts II, 111, and IV of the information, the state alleged several drug
enhancements. 2 After lengthy pre-trial proceedings, Beavers' trial in the Second
Case commenced on October 28, 2008. {Tr., vol. II, p. 4.) At trial and after the
state had rested, Beavers made an offer of proof to show that his use of
marijuana was medically necessary and that he should be permitted to present
his necessity defense to the jury. (See generally, Tr., vol. Ill, p. 67, L. 13 - p.
120, L. 1.) After hearing Beavers' testimony, the district court concluded that
there was no reasonable view of the evidence that would support giving an

2

The state also alleged that Beavers was a persistent violator in Part V of the
Information but later withdrew that allegation. (R., vol. II, p. 329; Tr., vol. Ill, p.
232, Ls. 14-18.)
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instruction on the common law defense of necessity and, therefore, Beavers
could not present his necessity defense to the jury. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 132, Ls. 1921.)
Subsequently, the jury convicted Beavers of all three offenses. (R., vol.
Ill, pp. 655-56.) Thereafter, Beavers waived his right to a jury trial on Parts 11, Ill,
and IV of the amended information and conditionally admitted the enhancements,
reseNing his right to argue that the verdicts in the First Case could not be used
to enhance his sentences in the Second Case. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 222, L. 10 - p.
232, L. 13.)
The First Case and the Second Case were consolidated for sentencing on
January 30, 2009. (R., vol. Ill, p. 680.) Prior to sentencing, both the state and
the defense submitted sentencing memorandums explaining their views of how
the various enhancements applied to the offenses.

(R., vol. Ill, pp. 661-71.)

During the first phase of the sentencing hearing, the district court discussed the
statutory sentencing scheme, including the minimum and maximum sentences
for each offense and how each enhancement could apply. (See generally, Tr.,
vol. I, p. 997, L. 3-p. 1025, L. 11.) During the second phase of the hearing, the
district court made corrections to the PSI, heard Beavers' lengthy af\ocution, and
listened to argument from the state and defense. (See generally, Tr., vol. I, p.
1025, L. 12 - p. 1062, L. 7.) Ultimately, the district court sentenced Beavers as
follows:
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CR2006-18813 [First Case]:
Count 1: Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(1)(B) Trafficking in
Marijuana of five (5) pounds or more, but less than twenty-five (25)
pounds,
for a total unified sentence not to exceed six (6) years,
commencing with a fixed period of three (3) years, to be followed by
an additional three (3) year indeterminate sentence, and a fine of
$10,000.00 (ten thousand) dollars.
Count 2: Idaho Code § 37-2732(a)(1)(8) Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver, Marijuana
for a total unified sentence not to exceed five (5) years,
commencing with a fixed period of one (1) year, to be followed by a
an additional four (4) year indeterminate sentence
The sentences on each count in case CR2006-18813 shall
run concurrent.
CR2007-27416 [Second Case]:
Count 1: Idaho Code § 37-2732(a)(1 )(8) Delivery of a
Controlled Substance, Marijuana
for a total unified sentence not to exceed five (5) years,
commencing with a fixed period of two (2) years, to be followed by
an additional three (3) year indeterminate sentence.
Count 2:
Idaho Code§ 37-2732(a)(1)(8) Possession of
a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver, Marijuana
for a total unified sentence not to exceed five (5) years,
commencing with a fixed period of two (2)years, to be followed by
an additional three (3) year indeterminate sentence.
Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(1)(A) Trafficking in
Count 3:
Marijuana of up to twenty-five (25) plants,
and defendant having waived a jury trial and having admitted
to the entry of a jury verdict of guilty in the Trafficking in Marijuana
in Count 1 in CR2006-18813, which jury verdict of guilty the court
finds to constitute a prior trafficking offense for purposes of
establishing a mandatory minimum fixed term pursuant to Idaho
Code Section 37-2732(B)(a)(7) for a second conviction;
for a total unified sentence to not exceed twelve (12) years,
commencing with a fixed period of two (2) years, to be followed by
an additional indeterminate period of ten (10) years, and a fine of
$5,000.00 (five thousand) dollars.

7

The sentences imposed in the above counts in CR200727416 shall run concurrent with each other. The sentences
imposed in CR2007-27416 shall run concurrent with the sentences
imposed in CR2006-18813.
(R., vol. 111, pp. 681-82; see also Tr., vol. I, p. 1072, L. 5 - p. 1073, L. 10.) In

sum, Beavers was sentenced to twelve years with three years fixed. (Id.)
Beavers appealed. (R., vol. Ill, p. 689-91.) The state cross-appealed on
the grounds that Beavers' sentence was illegal, and filed a Rule 35 motion
asserting that his sentence was illegal because the district court failed to apply
one of the sentencing enhancements that Beavers had admitted. (R., vol. Ill, pp.
693-96, 697-99.) The district court denied the state's motion. (R., vol. Ill, pp.
706-15.)
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ISSUES ON DIRECT APPEAL
Beavers states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court err in Mr. Beavers' First Case by
refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of necessity?
2.
Did the district court err in Mr. Beavers' Second Case by
refusing to allow Mr. Beavers to present evidence in support of his
proffered necessity defense, and by refusing to instruct the jury on
that defense?
3.
Did the district court err at Mr. Beavers' joint sentencing
hearing by enhancing Mr. Beavers' sentences in the Second Case
based on its finding that he had been previously convicted of
certain drug offenses in the First Case?
(Appellant's brief, p. 20.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
In the First Case, has Beavers failed to show that the district court erred in
refusing his jury instruction?
2.
In the Second Case, has Beavers failed to show that the district court
erred in refusing to allow Beavers to present evidence in support of his proffered
necessity defense, and by refusing to instruct the jury on that defense?
3.
Has Beavers failed to show that the district court erred at Beavers' joint
sentencing hearing by enhancing Beavers' sentences in the Second Case based
on its findings that Beavers had been previously convicted of certain offenses in
the First Case?
ISSUE ON CROSS APPEAL
1.
Did the district court err when, after withdrawing Beavers' admission to a
sentencing enhancement, it failed to reinstate the parties to the status quo prior
to the admission having been made?
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ARGUMENT ON DIRECT APPEAL
I.
Beavers Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Refusing His Jury
Instruction

A.

Introduction
Beavers claims error in the district court's refusal to instruct the jury that,

"even if it found that Mr. Beavers possessed marijuana, it could find him not guilty
on the basis of the common law defense of necessity based on the fact that his
use of marijuana was necessary to treat his medical condition." (Appellant's
brief, p. 21.) Beavers' argument is without merit for several reasons. First, the
district court, as a matter of law, could not instruct the jury on the necessity
defense. Second, even if the district court could instruct the jury on the necessity
defense, Beavers' presented no credible evidence of a specific immediate harm,
or that that same objective (improved health) could not have been accomplished
by a less offensive alternative. Beavers also failed to present any evidence that
there was a causal relationship between his use of marijuana and his purported
improved health.

B.

Standard of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844
P.2d 691, 694 (1992); Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 265, 16 P.3d 937, 941 (Ct.
App. 2000). To be reversible error, any error in the jury instructions must have
misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho
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970,977, 188 P.3d 912,919 (2008); State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303,310,955 P.2d
1082, 1089 (1998).

C.

"Necessity" Can Not Be A Viable Justification For The Crimes Of
Trafficking Or Possession With Intent To Deliver
Beavers argues that the district court erred in refusing his proposed

instruction regarding his "necessity defense."

(Appellant's brief, pp 21-28.)

However, because medical necessity, even if established, is not a defense to the
crimes of trafficking or possession with intent to deliver, Beavers' argument must
fail.

Idaho Code Section 19-2132(a) addresses jury instructions and states that
in "charging the jury, the court must state to them all matters of law necessary for
their information. Either party may present to the court any written charge and
request that it be given. If the court thinks it correct and pertinent, it must be
given; if not it must be refused." A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction
that is an erroneous statement of the law, is not supported by the evidence, is an
impermissible comment on the evidence or is adequately covered by other
instructions. State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 881, 736 P.2d 1327, 1335 (1987).
"In order to determine whether the defendant's proposed instruction should have
been given, this Court must examine the instructions that were given and the
evidence that was adduced at trial." J.g_,_ at 881, 736 P.2d at 1335. To be
reversible error, any error in the jury instructions must have misled the jury or
prejudiced the complaining party. Row, 131 Idaho at 310, 955 P .2d at 1089.
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When a defendant requests an instruction, I.C. § 19-2132 has been
interpreted as requiring a two-prong analysis. State v. Eastman, 122 Idaho 87,
90, 831 P.2d 555, 558 (1992). First, the trial court must determine if the theory
presented in the instruction applies to the case. j_g_,_ Second, the trial court must
then determine if the instruction is a correct statement of the law.

j_g_,_

If the

theory is not supported by the evidence, then the court must reject the
instruction. j_g_,_ But if the theory is supported by the evidence, then the court
must determine if the instruction is a correct statement of law. j_g_,_ If it is a correct
statement of the law, then the instruction should be given. j_g_,_ If the instruction is
an incorrect statement of the law, then the trial court is under an affirmative duty
to properly instruct the jury.

J__g__,_

at 91, 831 P.2d at 559.

The Idaho Supreme Court discussed the elements of the common law
defense of necessity in State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854,801 P.2d 563 (1990).
The basic premise behind the necessity defense is that a person who is forced to
commit an illegal offense in order to prevent a greater harm should not be
punished for such illegal act. Hastings, 118 Idaho at 855, 801 P.2d at 564. The
court reiterated the elements of the defense of necessity: (1) a specific threat of
immediate harm; (2) the circumstances which necessitate the illegal act must not
have been brought about by the defendant; (3) the same objective could not
have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative available to the actor;
and (4) the harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm avoided. j_g_,_; see
also State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413, 34 P.3d 1096 (Ct. App. 2001); ICJI No.
1512.
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As an initial matter, the defense of necessity is clearly inapplicable to the
crime of possession with intent to deliver and Beavers does not argue otherwise.
In State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413, 34 P.3d 1D96 (Ct. App. 20D1), the court of
appeal held that medical necessity could not be a viable justification for
possession with intent to deliver because the defendant's own medical need for
marijuana could not justify her possession of the drug with the intent to deliver it
to others.
Likewise, for these same reasons, necessity is not a viable justification for
trafficking. In 1992, the Idaho State Legislature adopted the crime of trafficking
and made it a crime separate and distinct from simple possession. Trafficking
applies to the possession of marijuana in the amount of 1 pound or more. I.C. §
37-2732B(a)(1 ). The legislature has effectively determined that possession of a
large amount of marijuana cannot be for personal use and has enhanced the
penalties for trafficking accordingly. Due to the sheer volume of marijuana that
must be possessed to be convicted of trafficking, the defense of necessity cannot
apply - an individual cannot "need" to possess one pound or more of marijuana.
Necessity can not be a viable justification for possession of such large quantities
of a controlled substance, especially when that substance is illegal to obtain in
any amount.

D.

The Legislature Has Determined That Marijuana Has No Medically
Accepted Use And. Therefore. The District Court Did Not Err In Refusing
To Give Beavers' Proffered Necessity Defense Jury Instruction
Application of a necessity defense would also be contrary to legislative

intent.

The Idaho State Legislature has determined that marijuana has no
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medically accepted use and, therefore, the district court could not instruct the jury
regarding Beavers' allegedly medically necessary use of marijuana. The Idaho
State Legislature adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") in
1971. In the CSA, the legislature chose to classify marijuana as a Schedule I
controlled substance. I.C. § 37-2705(d)(19). The only substances included in
Schedule I are substances that (1) have a high potential for abuse, and (2) have
"no accepted medical use in treatment in the United States" or lack accepted
safety for use in treatment under medical supervision.

I.C. § 37-2704.

In

classifying marijuana as a Schedule I substance, the legislature determined that
marijuana has no medical benefits. 3

Had the legislature chosen to do so,

marijuana could have been classified in a different schedule or been de-classified
entirely. 4
Because the legislature has already determined that marijuana has no
accepted medical use, the defense of necessity can not apply. The United State
Supreme Court explained in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers'
Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001 ):
Under any conception of legal necessity, one principle is
clear: The defense cannot succeed when the legislature itself has
made a "determination of values." In the case of the Controlled
Substances Act, the statute reflects a determination that marijuana
3

Notably, cocaine and opium are Schedule II substances that, although they
have a high potential for abuse and abuse of the substance may lead to severe
physical or physical dependence, have "currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States, or currently accepted medical use with severe
restrictions." I.C. § 32-2706.
4

The Idaho State Legislature adopted the CSA in 1971 and classified marijuana
as a Schedule I controlled substance at that time. The State Board of Pharmacy
now maintains the authority to reclassify controlled substances pursuant to the
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act. I.C. § 37-3702.
14

has no medical benefits worthy of an exception (outside the
confines of a Government-approved research project). Whereas
some other drugs can be dispensed and prescribed for medical
use, see 21 U.S.C. § 829, the same is not true for marijuana.
Indeed, for purposes of the Controlled Substances act, marijuana
has "no currently accepted medical use" at all.
(internal citations omitted).
Indeed, the structure of the CSA supports this conclusion.

Controlled

substances are divided into 6 schedules, depending, in part, on whether the drug
has a currently accepted medical use in treatment. See generally I.C. §§ 372704 - 2714. Drugs can only be placed on Schedule I if they have "no currently
accepted medical use." Accordingly, by placing marijuana on Schedule I, the
legislation has determined that marijuana does not have any accepted medical
use. Further, the Board of Pharmacy has been instructed to revise the schedules
annually.

I.C. § 37-2714.

If the Board of Pharmacy, pursuant to legislative

delegation, determined that marijuana had "any accepted medical use" then
marijuana could not remain classified as a Schedule I substance. The bard has
not changed marijuana's classification by the legislature as having no medicinal
use.
It can not be medically "necessary" to possess something which the
legislature has determined has "no currently accepted medical use."

For this

reason, the district court did not err in refusing to give Beavers' proffered jury
instruction concerning his necessity defense.
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E.

Beavers' Failed To Present Credible Evidence Supporting Two Elements
Of The Necessity Defense
Even if this court were to determine that the defense of necessity can

apply to the crime of trafficking marijuana, a review of the law and the record
shows that Beavers' necessity defense was not supported by any reasonable
view of the evidence. See State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 392, 924 P.2d 1230,
1236 (Ct. App. 1996). To be entitled to an instruction on an affirmative defense,
a defendant must "present facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case
relevant to [the] defense." State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66, 8 P.3d 657,
660-61 (Ct. App. 2000). To show a prima facie defense of necessity the
defendant must present evidence of (1) a specific threat of immediate harm; (2)
the circumstances which necessitate the illegal act must not have been brought
about by the defendant; (3) the same objective could not have been
accomplished by a less offensive alternative available to the actor; and (4) the
harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm avoided. Hastings, 118 Idaho
at 855, 801 P.2d at 564. To prevail on appeal, Beavers must show that there is a
reasonable view of the evidence presented that would support his theory of
necessity.

1.

Beavers Failed To Present Credible Evidence Showing A Specific
Threat Of An Immediate Harm - The First Element Of The
Necessity Defense

Beavers has failed present evidence of a specific threat of immediate
harm, the first element of the necessity defense. Beavers testified that his health
began to fail in 1996 and he began using marijuana medicinally, as opposed to
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recreationally, at that time. (Tr., vol. I, p. 799, L. 5 - p. 800, L. 11.) Beavers
asserts that "surely, abdominal pain, coupled with ongoing rectal bleeding and
severe headaches, all of which cases the sufferer to be completely incapacitated,
is a 'threat of immediate harm' within the meaning of Hastings."

(Appellant's

brief, p. 25.) However, Beavers testified that these were his symptoms at the
outset of his health problems in 1996 but that his health improved over time. (Tr.,
vol. I, p. 853, Ls. 5-13.) Thus, Beavers has failed to show "immediacy." At trial,
the following colloquy between Beavers and his attorney occurred:
Q:
Did [your condition] improve sufficiently that you had less
concern as to whether you were gravely ill or manageably ill?

A:

Well, as time progressed my condition continued to improve,
and so I felt that I was doing a reasonably good job at managing it.
And I still wasn't making a lot of money, so I wasn't extending
myself financially in any way, I mean Q:
Did - at that point, when your condition had improved
significantly, did you feel that you needed to have traditional
medical treatment?

A:

Well, everything becomes a financial choice. I mean, the
things that the prosecutor has referred to, I had several boats.
These are old wood boats I bought to do a project. Woodworking
and refinishing are things I do. These are not expensive drug-dollar
boats where I was putting lots of marijuana into hidden assets.
These were old boats to repair.
Q:
Again, I guess I was asking once your medical condition in
your mind had improved through your change of regimen, at that
time did you think that you were in dire need of traditional
medicine?

A:
No. My condition was improving. And so I had become
fairly convinced that what I had worked out, that my own self
diagnosis had been reasonably accurate and the steps that I had
taken to manage my condition were working. So I didn't feel
incredibly motivated to start spending money and going and seeing
doctors at that point.
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(Tr., vol. I, p. 855, L. 5 - p. 856, L. 7.) Even assuming, arguendo, that in 1996
Beavers' health problems constituted a "specific threat of immediate harm,"
Beavers admits that by 2006 (when he was arrested) his health problems were
largely under control and so he "didn't feel incredibly motivated to start spending
money and seeing doctors at that point." Beavers did not present evidence of a
"specific threat of an immediate harm."
Because Beavers failed to present evidence of an immediate harm, the
district court did not err in refusing to give Beavers' proffered necessity jury
instruction.

2.

Beavers Has Failed To Present Evidence Showing That The Same
Objective Could Not Have Been Accomplished By A Less Offensive
Alternative - The Third Element Of The Necessity Defense

The third element of the necessity defense required Beaver to "present
evidence showing that the same objective could not have been accomplished by
a less offensive alternative." Although Beavers asserts that his burden was only
to produce evidence on this point, and not to persuade the trier of fact
(Appellant's brief, p. 26), he is only entitled to his instruction if "there is a
reasonable view of the evidence presented in the case that would support his
theory." Eastman, 122 Idaho at 90, 831 P.2d at 558. Beavers failed to present
reasonable evidence of the third element of the necessity defense for two
reasons: (1) he failed to present evidence that the amount of marijuana that he
possessed was necessary and that his recovery could not have been
accomplished with a smaller amount; and (2) he failed to present reasonable
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evidence that he could have accomplished the same result through conventional
medicine.
Beavers was charged with trafficking in marijuana, more than twenty-five
pounds, and was convicted of trafficking in marijuana, between five and twentyfive pounds. (R., vol. I, pp. 66-67; R., vol. 111, p. 563.) The record is devoid of
any reasonable explanation as to why Beavers needed to possess marijuana in
such large quantities and why a smaller amount would not be sufficient to
adequately address his medical needs.

The only possible explanation that

Beavers gave is that he possessed the marijuana in such a great quantity
because he was preparing to move to Washington. (Tr., vol. I, p. 824, Ls. 13-22;

p. 826, Ls. 10-19.)
The district court determined that there was insufficient evidence to
support element 3 of the necessity defense - that the same objective could not
have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative available to the actor:
Well, the Court has determined not to give the necessity
defense instruction here. With regard to the elements of the
defense, the - I think the Court - it was not specifically stated, but
the test is an objective standard. In other words, the subjective
testimony of the defendant would be insufficient to establish the, in
and of itself, would be insufficient to establish as a matter of law
that the evidence in the record supported the giving of a defense. I
would agree that in State v. Hasting there is nothing there to
indicate that the medical necessity defense would not be
admissible, not only with regard to a possession charge but with
regard to a trafficking charge.
However, in this case the Court is concluding that certainly
with regard to the trafficking charge there is no - under no objective
standard is there any evidence here that would indicate that the
amounts involved were necessary in order to treat the condition.
So the Court is pretty comfortable with an absolute absence of
evidence with regard to that element on the trafficking charge.
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With regard to the lesser included of simple possession of
marijuana, should the jury get to that, the question is a closer one
because of the State versus Hastings case, but again because of
the uncontroverted evidence with regard to the amounts here and
the lack of evidence with regard - other than the subjective
testimony of the defendant himself which of course is certainly
pertinent and relevant on a mens rea element of why he is
possessing the substances, doesn't establish, in the court's view,
sufficiency of evidence to meet the elements of the defense, either
the specific threat of immediate harm or that the same objective
could not be accomplished by significantly smaller amounts, or, for
that matter, some other alternative method that is available.
So the Court's ruling even on the lesser included of the
possession charge, should the jury get to that, while State versus
Hastings certainly indicates that the necessity defense is not barred
as a matter of law, that has not been the ruling by this Court. The
Court has ruled specifically over the state's objection that the
necessity defense was available. It is the Court's view that the
proof in this case is insufficient as a matter of law to justify granting
- giving the instruction of common law necessity defense, even
with regard to the lesser of the simple possession of marijuana, and
certainly it does not apply to the trafficking charge.
(Tr., vol. I, p. 893, L. 11 - p. 895, L. 6.) Beavers has failed to show on the record
how this analysis of the requirement that he show that the same objective could
not otherwise be accomplished is erroneous.
No reasonable view of the evidence leads to the conclusion that Beavers
could not have achieved his objective in personal medical marijuana use without
engaging in trafficking.

Review of state laws legalizing this objective is

instructive. For example, in Washington, a qualified individual may only possess
a sixty-day supply of marijuana, which is defined as that amount of marijuana
that a qualifying patient would reasonably be expected to need over a period of
sixty days for their personal medical use. Wash. Rev. Code § 69-51A.080. In
Oregon, an individual with a medical marijuana card may possess no more than
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6 mature marijuana plants and 24 ounces of usable marijuana. Or. Rev. Stat. §
475.320. In Colorado, an individual with a medical marijuana card may possess
no more than 2 ounces of a usable form of marijuana and no more than six
marijuana plants, with three or fewer being mature, flowering plants that are
producing a usable form of marijuana.

In California, the law that limited

possession to no more than eight ounces of dried marijuana per qualified patient
and no more than six mature or 12 immature marijuana plants per qualified
patient may be unconstitutional and will likely be replaced with a "reasonableness
requirement." Cal. Health & Safety Code§ 11362.77; People v. Phomphakdy, 81
Cal. RpTr. 3d 443, 450 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 2008) (review granted);

People v.

Kelly, 77 Cal. RpTr. 3d 390 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 2008) (review granted).
Each of these states determined the amount of marijuana that it deemed
reasonable under its medical marijuana act. Beavers' possession of marijuana
for his "medical use" greatly exceeds even the most liberal standard discussed
above.

Beavers admitted to possessing 45 marijuana plants and the state's

witness testified that he also possessed 25.5 pounds of loose, dried marijuana.
(Tr., vol. I, p. 847, Ls. 8-10; p. 668, Ls. 5-14.)

Beavers testified that he was

consuming between a quarter ounce and a half ounce per day. (Tr., vol. I, p.
826, Ls. 3-5.)

Even assuming that he only possessed 5 pounds (he was

convicted of trafficking in marijuana, 5 pounds or more but less than 25 pounds),
and the high end of his daily use of one half ounce per day, Beavers had a 160
day current supply with a crop to supply much, much more.
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Under no

reasonable view does Beavers' possession of 45 marijuana plants and
approximately 25 pounds of marijuana qualify as "personal use."
In addition, Beavers failed to present any reasonable evidence that the
same objective could have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative by
engaging in conventional medicine. Although Beavers asserted that originally he
could not afford a doctor, he later conceded that by 2005 he was feeling better
and working more but still chose not to go to a doctor. (Tr., vol. I, p. 853, L. 2 p. 855, L. 4.) He testified that he purchased a home and continued to make his
mortgage payments on it throughout his illness, that he made improvements to
his home, acquired several boats and vehicles, purchased land in Washington,
and made improvements to the land in Washington. (Tr., vol. I, p. 827, L. 19 - p.
834, L. 2.)

He admitted that "everything just becomes a financial choice" and

that when he began to feel better he just "didn't feel incredibly motivated to start
spending money and seeing doctors at that point." (Tr., vol. I, p. 855, L. 16 - p.
856, L. 7 .) Beavers failed to present evidence that he had no alternative but to
illegally traffic in marijuana to treat his medical issues.

F.

Beavers Presented Failed To Present A Causal Relationship Between His
Use Of Marijuana And His Allegedly Improved Health Conditions
Finally, although not specifically articulated as a separate element of the

necessity defense in Hastings, there is undoubtedly a requirement that there be
causal connection between the unlawful conduct and the harm to be averted.
See United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 195 (9 th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 433 (9 th Cir .. 1985). Certainly when the Hastings court is
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talking about "circumstances which necessitated the illegal act" and the
"objective" of the act being "accomplished" it is incorporating causation.
Hastings, 118 Idaho at 855, 801 P.2d at 564. The "basic premise" behind the
necessity defense is that a person is "compelled to commit an illegal act in order
to prevent a greater harm." )Q_,_ (emphasis added).
Beavers presented no nexus between his use of marijuana and his
allegedly improved health and therefore offered no evidence that his marijuana
trafficking prevented a "greater harm." There was no medical testimony that his
use of marijuana actually improved his symptoms. The record is devoid of any
expert witnesses, doctor's reports, or clinical research trials that would support
his claim that marijuana improved his medical condition.

Beavers' symptoms

could have improved from any number of reasons - his improved organic diet,
exercise, or even just time. Beavers testified that marijuana made him feel better
- that eating it and smoking it relaxed him: "I tend to be an anxious person, and
so for me smoking buds would be what I would guess I would a kind of a mood
stabilizer.

I mean, I could relax and be calm and feel a feeling of elation, a

feeling of well-being."

(Tr., vol. I, p. 806, Ls. 4-13; p. 807, Ls. 12-18.)

Undoubtedly, marijuana made him feel better, at least temporarily, which is the
exact reason why people smoke and ingest it. However, Beavers has provided
no correlation between his medical condition and his trafficking in marijuana,
other than his self-diagnosed "I feel better when I use it." Thus, there was no
causal connection between the conduct and the harm, and the district court
therefore properly refused Beavers' jury instruction.
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11.
Beavers Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In His Second
Case By Refusing To Let Him Present Evidence In Support Of His Proffered
Necessity Defense And Refusing To Instruct The Jury On That Defense
A.

Introduction
In the Second Case, Beavers was convicted of delivery, possession of

marijuana with intent to deliver, and trafficking in marijuana. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 65556.) On appeal, Beavers asserts that the district court erred in the Second Case
by denying him the opportunity to present evidence concerning his purported
medical need for marijuana and refusing to instruct the jury of his necessity
defense. (Appellant's brief, pp. 28-29.) Beavers argument, however, is without
merit.

B.

Standard of Review
Whether proffered evidence is sufficient to make a prima facie showing of

an affirmative defense is reviewed de novo. State v. Chisholm, 126 Idaho 319,
883 P.2d 974 (Ct. App. 1994).

C.

The District Court Correctly Refused To Pennit Beavers To Present
Evidence In Support Of His Proffered Necessity Defense And Correctly
Refused To Instruct The Jury On That Defense
Proposed evidence is irrelevant if it is offered only to prove an affirmative

defense which is shown to be inadequate as a matter of law.

Chisholm, 126

Idaho at 321, 882 P.2d at 976. When the offered evidence, even if it is believed
by a jury, would not make a prima facie showing of one element of an affirmative
defense, there is no right to present that defense at trial.

kl

The United States

Supreme Court explained in United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,416 (1980):
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The requirement of a threshold showing on the part of those who
assert an affirmative defense to a crime is by no means a
derogation of the importance of the jury as a judge of credibility.
Nor is it based on any distrust of the jury's ability to separate fact
from fiction. On the contrary, it is a testament to the importance of
trial by jury and the need to husband the resources necessary for
that process by limiting evidence in a trial to that directed at the
elements of the crime or at affirmative defenses. If, as, we here
hold, an affirmative defense consists of several elements and
testimony supporting one element is insufficient to sustain it even if
believed, the trial court and jury need not be burdened with
testimony supporting other elements of the defense.
Accordingly, if the evidence presented in a defendant's offer of proof, even if
believed by the jury, would not support one or more elements of the necessity
defense, the evidence was properly excluded. Chisholm, 126 Idaho at 321, 882
P.2d at 976. Here, Beavers failed to present evidence that supported elements
of his necessity defense.

1.

Beavers Failed To Present Evidence In His Offer Of Proof Of A
Specific Threat Of Immediate Harm

Beavers failed to present evidence in his offer of proof of a specific threat
of immediate harm. It is not enough for him to simply assert that he felt bad and
marijuana made him feel better. Beavers testified that initially, around 1996, his
symptoms were painful and debilitating but that they had lessened by 2006, and
that he believed that his improved health was from the use of marijuana. (See
generally Tr., vol. Ill, p. 67, L. 12 - p. 120, L. 1.) Further, in the time between his
first arrest and his second arrest, Beavers visited a physician who prescribed him
conventional prescriptions for high blood pressure and irritable bowel syndrome.
(Tr., vol. 111, p. 76, Ls. 5-17; p. 85, Ls. 17-22.) Within several weeks he ceased
taking the drug prescribed for his irritable bowel syndrome because, although it
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was working, he began experience side effects and, rather than returning to his
physician, he simply began using marijuana again. (Tr., vol. Ill, 77, L. 3 - 79, L.

6.)
That Beavers' irritable bowel syndrome was not a threat of immediate
harm that could only be remedied by his use of marijuana is highlighted by the
fact that when faced with a true emergency - painful kidney stones - Beavers
went to the emergency room and received oonventional medical treatment. (Tr.,
vol. Ill, p. 112, L. 18 - p. 113, L. 12.) It is further highlighted by the fact that in
1989 he purchased a home, continued to pay his mortgage on his house from
1996 through 2006, made improvements to the house, purchased two vehicles,
purchased two boats, and bought materials with which to grow marijuana,
including grow lights, books, DVDs, and seeds. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 100, L. 19 - p.
105, L. 5.)

Had Beavers' medical condition actually constituted a "specific

immediate harm," he clearly had the funds to visit a regular physician for his
health concerns. Beavers simply chose to use marijuana instead. Beavers failed
to present reasonable evidence of a specific immediate harm. The district court
did not err in refusing to permit Beavers to present his necessity defense to the
jury or in refusing to give Beavers' proffered jury instruction.

2.

Beavers Failed To Present Evidence In His Offer Of Proof That The
Same Objective Could Have Been Accomplished By A Less
Offensive Alternative

Beavers failed to present evidence in his offer of proof that the same
objective could have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative.

As

discussed in 11.C.1 above, Beavers had the funds to obtain conventional medical
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treatment, he simply chose not to do so because of his preference for marijuana.
Conventional medical treatment is clearly a less offensive alternative to his use of
marijuana.
At his second trial, Beavers again testified that he had purchased a home
and remodeled it and that he had purchased several vehicles and boats. (Tr.,
vol. Ill, p. 100, L. 19 - p. 104, L. 2.)

He also admitted to purchasing the

equipment and materials necessary to start his new grow operation. (Tr., vol. Ill,
p. 104, L. 3 - p. 105, L. 6.) Again, it is apparent that Beavers had the means to
obtain conventional medicine, but simply preferred to use marijuana.

For this

reason, he failed to present evidence that same objective could have been
accomplished through less offensive alternatives.
In addition, at Beavers' second trial, he admitted that he possessed 31
marijuana plants and the startings for an additional 49 plants. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 108,
Ls. 7-17.)

Again, this amount of marijuana far exceeds what even the most

liberal states with medical marijuana laws allow its patients to possess for
personal medical use. Under no reasonable view does Beavers possession of
31 marijuana plans and 49 starts constitute "personal use." The district court did
not err in refusing to permit Beavers to present evidence of his necessity defense
or in refusing to instruct the jury concerning the defense.
In fact, the district court specifically found that Beavers failed to present
reasonable evidence of both the first and third elements of the necessity defense
test - that Beavers presented no evidence of a specific immediate harm and that
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he presented no evidence showing that the same objective could not have been
accomplished by a less offensive alternative. The district court held:
Well, I mean, I can agree that the defendant, of course, is
entitled to have his legal theory of defense submitted to the jury by
an instruction. And as pointed out, medical necessity, in fact, is not
a recognized defense in the state of Idaho. And I do realize, of
course, that the defendant has a common law necessity defense
available to him, as do all defendants. And as indicated by Ms.
Wick, the necessity defense cannot logically apply to the charge of
delivery of marijuana or to possession of marijuana with intent to
deliver.
But with reference to the lesser defense [sic] of simple
possession, it's my opinion that, based upon the evidence you
submitted outside the presence of the jury, that there's an absence
of evidence that the defendant lacked adequate legal medical
alternatives to the use of marijuana, that there's no reasonable
evidence of any specific threat of any immediate harm to the
defendant, that there's no reasonable evidence that the defendant
could have prevented the threatened harm by any less offensive
alternative such as the reasonable pursuit of medical attention,
which I don't find he engaged in.
Specifically I mean he complained of irritable bowel
syndrome, depression, anxiety, hypertension, headaches, angina.
Certainly there's not even any suggestion that he sought
psychological or psychiatric care and that he pursued, in my
opinion any - I don't believe he reasonably pursed medical
attention for the complaints that he has. Certainly had he done so,
he very well may have been able to receive legally prescribed
medication for any psychological problem such as depression or
anxiety or any medical condition that he complained of such as high
blood pressure.
There was no reasonable evidence submitted by the
defense that, based upon the amount seized from the defendant
and the number of marijuana plants involved and the fact that he
was actually selling marijuana, that the harm caused by violating
the law was less than the threatened harm. Certainly it's difficult to
belief [sic] that he was simply growing for his own use when, at the
same - if, at the same time as the evidence clearly shows, he was
selling marijuana.
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So after having considered all of the evidence submitted by
the State during the trial as well as the evidence submitted by the
defendant outside the presence of the jury, its my determination
that there's no - that, in fact, no reasonable view of the evidence
would support the giving of the instruction on common law defense
of necessity.
(Tr., vol. Ill, p.130, L. 21 - p. 132, L. 21.)
Beavers failed to present any reasonable evidence as to the first or third
elements of the necessity defense and, therefore, the district court did not err in
refusing to permit Beavers to present evidence concerning this defense to the
jury or in refusing to give Beavers' proffered jury instruction.
In addition, the state adopts its arguments in J.C. and I.D. supra for its
argument that necessity can never be a defense to trafficking. Also, the state
adopts in argument in I.F. supra because, again, the record from the second trial
is devoid of any causal connection between Beavers marijuana use and his
purported improved medical condition.
Because Beavers failed to present evidence that supported elements of
his necessity defense, the district court did not err when it refused to permit him
to assert the necessity defense to the jury or when it refused his jury instruction.

111.
The District Court Correctly Enhanced Beavers' Sentences In The Second Case
A.

Introduction
Beavers asserts that his sentences in the Second Case could not be

enhanced by the prior convictions in his First Case, because those prior
convictions did not exist at the time that he committed the offenses in the Second
Case.

(Appellant's brief, p. 37.)

The district court correctly interpreted the
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applicable enhancement statute in enhancing Beavers' sentence in the Second
Case. Further, even if the district court erred in applying the enhancement, such
error is harmless.

B.

Standard of Review
The interpretation and application of a statute present questions of law

over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Clark, 132 Idaho
337,338,971 P.2d 1161, 1162 (Ct. App.1999).
'

i

C.

The District Court Correctly Enhanced Beavers' Second Trafficking
Conviction
As an initial matter, the state alleged that three distinct enhancements

applied to Beavers' Second Case. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 586-89.) However, the district
court only applied one of the sentencing enhancements to Beavers' ultimate
sentence. The district court found I.C. § 37-2739A inapplicable because Beavers
was not adequately advised of increased penalties, which increased the
mandatory minimum sentence to three years and the maximum sentence to life
imprisonment, when he waived his right to a trial on the enhancement.

(Tr., vol.

I, p. 1068, L. 12 - p. 1072, L. 1.) In addition, the district court did not enhance
Beavers sentence based upon 1.C. § 37-2739, which uses the permissive
language "may." Thus, the issue is whether the district court properly applied the
sentencing enhancement found at I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(7). This statute reads, in
its entirety:

"A second conviction for any trafficking offense as defined in

subsection (a) of this section shall result in a mandatory minimum fixed term
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that is twice that otherwise required under this section." I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(7)
(emphasis added).
In the Second Case, Beavers was convicted of trafficking in marijuana, 25
marijuana plants or more but fewer than 50 marijuana plants, in violation of I.C. §
37-2732B{a)(1 )(A),

which

carries

a

mandatory

minimum

sentence

of

imprisonment of one year and a fine of not less than $5000.00. (R., vol. Ill, p.
655; I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(1)(A).) The maximum sentence for this crime is fifteen
years and a fine of not more than $50,000.00. I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(1 )(E). The
district court, applying I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(7), enhanced the minimum fixed
sentence from one year to two years and imposed an indeterminate period of ten
years, for a total sentence of twelve years. (R., vol. 111, p. 681.)
Beavers asserts that the application of the enhancement was error
because at the time that "Beavers committed the offenses alleged in the Second
I

\

!

Case, he had no prior drug convictions."

(Appellant's brief, pp. 36-37.)

It

appears that no Idaho court has yet addressed this exact issue. However, his
argument is contrary to the plain language of the statute, which demands no
specific sequence, but only requires a prior trafficking conviction before the
mandatory minimum sentence can be imposed.
Idaho law clearly establishes that one is convicted, not upon sentencing,
but upon either a guilty plea or a finding of guilt by a jury after trial. United States
v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 179 P .3d 1059 (2008). In Sharp, the Idaho Supreme
Court noted that a conviction is a separate and distinction occurrence from
punishment and therefore must occur first. Sharp, 145 Idaho at 404, 179 P .3d at
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1060.

The Court specifically rejected the notion that "conviction" means a

judgment of conviction. Sharp, 145 Idaho at 405, 179 P.3d at 1061.
Beavers committed his first offenses on August 13, 2006. (R., vol. I, p.
30.) Beavers committed the second offenses on November 21, 2007. (R., vol. 11,
pp. 276-77 .) Beavers was convicted of the first offenses on June 19, 2008 upon
"a finding of guilt by a jury after trial," and was convicted of the second offenses
on December 30, 2008 upon "a finding of guilt by a jury after trial." (R., vol. 111,
pp. 562-64; R., vol. Ill, pp. 655-56.) Therefore, Beavers was convicted of the
felony offense of trafficking in his First Case prior to his conviction of trafficking in
the Second Case, and is properly subject to the two-year minimum term found in
I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(7).
Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(7) is similar to the DUI enhancement statute
located at I.C. § 18-8005(4). In State v. Craig, 117 Idaho 983,793 P.2d 215
(1990), the Idaho Supreme Court was faced with the similar question of whether
a second DUI conviction needed to precede a third DUI violation in order for the
defendant to subject to a felony conviction under the DUI enhancement statute.
The court concluded that so long as a defendant "'is found guilty of three (3) or
more violations of the provisions of the [DUI statute] ... within five (5) years,' he
has committed a felony, regardless of whether the third violation preceded the
second conviction."

Craig, 117 Idaho at 985, 793 P.2d at 217.

Likewise, the

plain language of the trafficking enhancement statute simply applies to a second
conviction.
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Beavers compares this enhancement statute to the persistent violator
statute found at I.C. § 19-2514 and argues that the statute is "based on the idea
that all such enhancements are designed to punish recidivism."

(Appellant's

brief, p. 38.) This argument fails, however, for three reasons. First, the Court will
resort to statutory construction only where legislative intent cannot be inferred
from the plain language of the statute. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22
P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001 ). Because, as argued above, the enhancement by
its plain language applies when there are successive crimes and successive
convictions, resorting to the policy argument proposed by Beavers is contrary to
applicable legal standards.
i

I

Second, it is not at all apparent that the legislature's intent was the same
in relation to the present statute as with the habitual offender statute. I.C. § 3737-2732B(a)(7) only enhances the fixed portion for trafficking offenses.

In

contrast, I.C. § 19-2514 enhances any third felony conviction, for crimes ranging
from murder to insufficient fund checks, to a potential life sentence.

Beavers'

assumption that the legislature wanted to give drug traffickers an opportunity to
i

I

rehabilitate after a conviction before doubling the fixed penalty for multiple
trafficking offenses, merely because it had done so for general habitual
offenders, is entirely speculative.

On the contrary, the very nature of fixed

minimum sentences indicates more concern with punishment and prevention
than with rehabilitation of the trafficker.
Third, application of the standard that Beavers advocates does not assist
him. As a general rule, under the persistent violator statute convictions entered
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the same day or charged in the same information count as a single violation for
establishing a defendant's persistent violator status, which allows a defendant an
opportunity to rehabilitate between convictions and assures that the first time
offender who commits multiples felonies during the same course of events will be
warned about the persistent violator statute.

State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341,

344, 715 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Clark, 132 Idaho 337,339,
971 P.2d 1161, 1163 (Ct. App. 1999). However, "the nature of the convictions in
any given situation must be examined to make certain that the general rule is
appropriate." Brandt, 110 Idaho at 344, 715 P.2d at 1014.
Here, given the nature of Beavers' convictions, the general rule is not
appropriate. The events giving rise to the charges in the First Case and the
Second Case were charged independently and were tried separately. Further,
even if he had not been previously convicted at the time that he committed the
offenses in the Second Case, Beavers was certainly on notice, after having all of
his marijuana and related paraphernalia seized after his arrest in the First Case,
that his conduct was illegal and that the state would prosecute him for this
conduct.

Despite this knowledge, Beavers nonetheless began a new grow

operation and sold marijuana to a confidential informant.

Beavers had the

opportunity to reform his behavior and to rehabilitate himself between his first
and second arrest and simply failed to do so.
Finally, even if the district court erred in applying this enhancement, such
error was harmless.

Generally, an error will be regarded as harmless if the

appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the same result
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would have been reached, regardless of the error. State v. Clark, 132 Idaho 337,
340, 971 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Ct. App. 1999). Here, Beavers would have received
the same sentence regardless of whether the district court applied the sentencing
enhancement or not.
As an initial matter, Beavers' sentence on his second trafficking conviction
was well within the statutory maximum for trafficking, even if the district court had
not applied the sentencing enhancement.

Further, the fixed portion of his

sentence on the second trafficking conviction was only two years, which is less
than the three year minimum fixed sentence on his first trafficking conviction.
Against the prosecutor's request, the district court ordered all of the sentences
from both the First Case and the Second Case to run concurrently. (Tr., vol. Ill,
p. 1053, L. 19- p. 1054, L. 13; p. 1072, Ls. 2-24.) Thus, the enhancement does
not change Beavers' minimum term of imprisonment. Only the tail portion of his
second trafficking sentence (which was unaffected by the enhancement)
lengthened Beavers' exposure to additional prison or parole time. The district
court explained its reasoning for the lengthier tail on Beavers' second trafficking
conviction:
With regard to the outside sentence, if we hadn't had the
second trafficking case, frankly, the first case I would think that
three-year mandatory minimum might well overdo the seriousness
of what was needed because of the circumstances of that first case
and certainly wouldn't need to go anywhere near the 15 years on
the first case.
But I agree with the state. When you are out on, you know,
a charge for trafficking, and you just keep doing it, it indicates that
some sort of greater tail or greater indeterminate is needed in the
second case to point out the consequences here, and you are
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looking at a long time in prison if you don't take advantage of the
rehabilitative courses.
Basically, in terms of the overall goals of sentencing here, I
feel an overall term of 12 years is probably sufficient to meet the
goals of sentencing. And I can impose that on the Count Ill in the
second case, the trafficking case, by imposing the two years fixed,
then years indeterminate for a total not to exceed 12 years in the
state penitentiary. That gives the mandatory minimum doubled on
the Count Ill for trafficking of the two years fix and ten years
indeterminate, for a total not to exceed 12 years.

i

I

i

I

But then we have the second case where you go out and sell
the stuff to a Cl and regardless of the Cl's view of your motives,
that is neither here nor there, as far as the Court is concerned. The
fact is you sold it to a Cl, and that's why I am going to 12 years in
Count Ill [the trafficking conviction] in the second case, in fact, in
essence doubling the sentence because its repetitive conduct, and
the Court - although it is marijuana and all that, so on and so forth,
there are still serious matters that need to be addressed.
(Tr., vol. I, p. 1066, L. 7 - p. 1068, L. 4.) It is clear that the district court was not
relying on the enhancement for the lengthier indeterminate sentence but rather
on the fact that this was Beavers' second trafficking offense and that it was
"repetitive conduct."

Even without the application of the enhancement, the

district court would have given Beavers a lengthier sentence in the second case.
For this reason, even if the district court committed error in applying the
enhancement, such error was harmless.
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ARGUMENT ON CROSS APPEAL

The District Court Erred When. After Withdrawing Beavers' Admission. It Failed
To Reinstate The Parties To The Status Quo Prior To The Admission Having
Been Made

A.

Introduction
In the Second Case, Beavers admitted Part Ill of the Amended

Information.

Part Ill alleged that he had previously committed a trafficking

offense and, pursuant to I.C. § 37-2739A, that any sentence imposed upon his
conviction of delivery in the Second Case was to include a mandatory minimum
fixed term of imprisonment to run consecutively to any other sentence imposed.
(R., vol. 111, p. 588.)

The district court held that Beavers' plea to this

enhancement was not entered knowingly and, therefore, it would not apply the
enhancement. (Tr., vol. I, p. 1068, L. 12- p. 1072, L. 1.) Rather than return to
the parties to the status quo prior to the admission, the district court proceeded to
sentencing as if the state had never charged the enhancement. By its actions,
the district court effectively dismissed the enhancement. The district court further
decided that the sentencing goals could be met without the need for this
enhancement, and, even it applied the enhancement, it did not need to run the
enhancement consecutive to Beavers' other sentences. The district court erred
by dismissing the enhancement.

8.

Standard of Review
Whether the district court erred as a matter of law in dismissing a criminal

action is a question of law over which an appellate court exercises free review.
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State v. Bilbao, 130 Idaho 500, 502, 943 P.2d 926, 928 (1997).

The state

asserts that same standard of review applies when a district court de facto
dismisses a sentencing enhancement by its refusal to apply that enhancement
and its refusal to allow the state to proceed on its charge.

C.

The District Court Erred When, After Withdrawing Beavers' Admission, It
Failed To Reinstate The Parties To The Status Quo Prior To The
Admission Having Been Made
Beavers never filed

a motion to withdraw his admission to the

enhancement. Rather, at sentencing the district court decided, sua sponte, that
Beavers did not knowingly admit the enhancement because he was not informed
of its maximum sentencing consequences and, therefore, it would not apply the
enhancement. (Tr., vol. I, p. 1069, L. 5- p. 1072, L. 1; R., vol. Ill, p. 707.) For
purposes of this appeal, the state does not contest that Beavers was not
adequately informed of the maximum consequences associated with his
admission to the enhancement. However, the state asserts that the district court
erred when, after making the finding that Beavers was not adequately informed
of the sentencing consequences and withdrawing Beavers' plea, it failed to return
the parties to the status quo prior to the admission being made. Although the
district court may have had the discretion to withdraw Beavers' plea, it had no
discretion to simply ignore the charged enhancement and to proceed to
sentencing as if the enhancement charge did not exist.
In essence, the district court "deleted" the enhancement and proceeded to
sentence Beavers as if the state had never charged the enhancement.

This

effectively dismissed Part Ill of the state's Information. A court may dismiss a

38

criminal case only upon providing notice to the parties of its intent to dismiss.
I.C.R. 48. The district court erred by "deleting" the enhancement and effectively
dismissing Part Ill of the state's Information without providing notice to the
parties, particularly to the state.
When a guilty plea is withdrawn, the proper course of action is to return
the parties to the status quo. State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 568, 990 P.2d
144, 149 (Ct. App. 1999) (in dissent). After withdrawing Beavers' guilty plea to
the charge, the district court was obligated to set the matter for trial on the
enhancement and to not simply ignore the enhancement. The district court erred
in failing to failing to return the parties to the status quo.
In State v. Harrington, Harrington, following a jury trial where he was
convicted of burglary and malicious injury to property, admitted to being a
persistent violator.

Harrington, 133 Idaho at 564, 990 P.2d at 145.

Several

weeks later, Harrington filed a motion to withdraw his persistent violator
admission and a hearing was held on the matter. Harrington, 133 Idaho at 565,
990 P.2d at 146. At the hearing, Harrington presented evidence that the two
prior convictions to which he had admitted stemmed from a single prosecution
and he was not, therefore, a persistent violator.

&

The district court did not

formally rule on Harrington's motion to withdraw his admission, but did issue an
order amending its earlier pre-sentence order to reflect its revised treatment of
Harrington's two prior felonies as one conviction for purposes of sentencing
enhancement.

&

The district court then sentenced Harrington and suspended

the sentences.

&

The state appealed, asserting that the district court erred in

39

failing to return the parties to the status quo after it determined that Harrington
was not a persistent violator. Harrington, 133 Idaho at 566,990 P.2d at 147.
The court of appeals held that any procedural error committed by the court
was harmless. jg_,_ The court of appeals examined the language of the persistent
violator statute and held that based on the language that a defendant "be
sentenced to a term in the custody of the state board of correction which term
shall be for not less than five (5) years and said term may extend to life," that the
district court was free to suspend Harrington's sentence. Harrington, 133 Idaho
at 567, 990 P.2d at 148. The court of appeals further found that based on the
district court's comments at Harrington's sentencing that Harrington would have
received the same sentence, even assuming that he was found to be a persistent
violator. J.Q,_
Unlike Harrington, the error in this case is not harmless and the district
court would not have imposed the same sentence if it had applied the
enhancement. Unlike the persistent violator statute at issue in Harrington, I.C. §
37-2739A includes the language: "The mandatory minimum period of three (3)

years incarceration shall not be reduced and shall run consecutively to any
other sentence imposed by the court." I.C. § 37-2739A (emphasis added).
The plain language of the statute required Beavers to serve three years
consecutive to any other sentence imposed by the court.

Beavers was

sentenced to three years fixed in the First Case and to two years fixed on the
other offenses in the Second Case.

The mandatory three year period of

incarceration in I.C. § 37-2739A doubled Beavers' mandatory period of
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incarceration.

For this reason, Beavers would not have received the same

sentence whether or not the enhancement was applied, and the district court's
error was not harmless.

D.

The District Court Erred When It Decided That Sentencing Goals Had
Been Met And So It Would Not Apply The Enhancement
The district court also abused its discretion when it determined that, even

if Beavers' admission had been voluntary, it still would not apply the
enhancement because it had met the goals of sentencing without regard to the
enhancement. The district court erred in making this finding.
The Idaho Constitution provides that "[T]he legislature can provide
mandatory minimum sentences for any crimes, and any sentence imposed shall
not be less that the mandatory minimum sentence so provided. Any mandatory
minimum sentence so imposed shall not be reduced." Idaho Const. art. V, § 13.
"A mandatory minimum sentence is not subject to reduction by a district court
because the sentencing requirements are mandatory."
Idaho 791, 797, 69 P.3d 1052, 1058 (2003).

State v. Hansen, 138

Idaho Code § 37-2739A is a

sentence enhancement statute that requires a mandatory minimum sentence of
three years fixed.
At sentencing, the district court stated: "I find the goals of sentencing can
easily be met without regard to [l.C. § 37-2739A]." (Tr., vol. I, p. 1068, Ls. 1516.) The court reiterated this conclusion in its Memorandum and Order Denying
Rule 35 Motion, which it issued in response to the State's Rule 35 motion to
correct an illegal sentence:
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In this very unusual case, imposing the sentence of only two (2)
years fixed on the Delivery charge did not adversely affect the
Court's ability to achieve the goals of sentencing under Idaho law
for all charges in both cases.
In terms of meeting the goals of sentencing, it was this
Court's conclusion that the enhanced mandatory minimum of two
(2) years fixed on the trafficking charge on Count Ill in this case met
the goals of sentencing for the fixed portion of the sentence
imposed on each conviction in this case.
(R., vol. Ill, p. 708.)

The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the
statute. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360,362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). Those
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute
must be construed as a whole.

&

Where the language of a statute is plain and

unambiguous, the court must give effect to the statute as written, without
engaging in statutory construction.

State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988

P.2d 685,688 (1999); State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362,365,913 P.2d 578,581
(1996). "Ambiguity is not established merely because differing interpretations are
presented to the Court. Otherwise, all statutes would be considered ambiguous."
Schwartz, 139 Idaho at 362, 79 P.3d at 721.
The plain language of the statute creates a mandatory minimum sentence.
Idaho Code § 37-2739A states:
Any person who is convicted of violating the felony provisions of
section 37-2732(a), Idaho Code, by distributing controlled
substances to another person, who is not subject to a fixed
minimum term under section 37-27398, Idaho Code, and who has
previously been convicted within the past ten (10) years in a court
of the United States, any state or a political subdivision of one or
more felony offenses of dealing, selling or trafficking in controlled
substances on an occasion or occasions different from the felony
violation of section 37-2732(a), Idaho Code, and which offense or
offenses were punishable in such court by imprisonment in excess
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of one (1) year, shall be sentenced to the custody of the state board
of correction for a mandatory minimum period of time of not less
than three (3) years or for such greater period as the court may
impose up to a maximum of life imprisonment. The mandatory
minimum period of three (3) years incarceration shall not be
reduced and shall run consecutively to any other sentence
imposed by the court.
I.C. § 37-2739A (emphasis added).
The district court ignored the plain meaning of this statute. There is no
ambiguity and the legislative intent is clear from the plain meaning of the words
of the statute.

The minimum term of imprisonment contemplated under this

statute is three years.

I.C. § 37-2739A.

Because the application of an

enhancement is mandatory, the district court did not have the power to simply
ignore it.

On remand, if Beavers is found guilty after trial or admits to the

enhancement, the state requests that the district court be ordered to follow its
constitutional duty and apply the enhancement.

E.

The District Court Erred When It Determined That Even If It Applied The
Enhancement, It Would Not Run Consecutively To Beavers' Other
Sentences
Finally, the district court erred when it concluded that even if it applied the

enhancement, that the enhancement did not need to run consecutive to Beavers'
other sentences. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 709-11.) The district court held that a three
year minimum fixed on the delivery conviction in the Second Case, "imposed
concurrently with the sentences imposed on the other charges for which the
defendant was sentenced at the sentencing hearing would fully comply with the
mandate of Section 37-2739A." (R. vol. Ill, p. 711.) The plain language of the
statute is clear: "The mandatory minimum period of three (3) years incarceration
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shall not be reduced and shall run consecutively to any other sentence

imposed by the court." I.C. 37-2739A (emphasis added.) The district court
was required to impose a minimum three year fixed term of imprisonment upon
Beavers' conviction of Delivery in the Second Case and was required to run that
sentence consecutive to all the other sentences imposed in both the First Case
and Second Case, because all of the sentences were imposed at the same time,
on the same day, and at the same hearing. At a bare minimum, the enhanced
sentence must run consecutive to the other sentences imposed in the same case
(the Second Case). The sentence imposed on delivery conviction in the Second
Case is therefore illegal and must be corrected in conformity with the
requirements of I.C. § 37-2739A.
The mandatory minimum nature of Idaho Code § 37-2739A has been
addressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals which held that a sentencing
enhancement under that statute requires a "minimum three-year fixed term be
imposed on a second-time trafficker in drugs." State v. Way, 117 Idaho 594,
596-97, 790 P.2d 375, 377-78 (Ct. App. 1990). The Court in Way concluded that
"the minimum three-year term runs consecutive to any other sentence imposed

at the same time by the court for a felony violation of J.C. § 37-2732(a)." Way,
117 Idaho at 597, 790 P.2d at 378 (italics in original). Beavers was convicted of
two other crimes in the Second Case and three crimes in the First Case. These
other sentences were imposed at the same time as his sentence on the delivery
charge. Thus, the three year minimum sentence on the delivery charge must run
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consecutive to the other two sentences in the Second Case and consecutive to
the sentences in the First Case. The district court erred in ruling otherwise.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Mark Beavers'
convictions. The state further requests that his sentences be vacated and the
case remanded so that a jury can decide whether LC. § 37-2739A applies.
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